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Stewart Goetz’s Freedom, Teleology, and Evil is an impressive defense 
of a  non-causal libertarian view of free will. Though not without 
its defenders, noncausal accounts have tended to receive not only 
considerably less attention than have event-causal or agent-causal views, 
but also less sympathy. Goetz’s book is a  formidable challenge to these 
tendencies and worthy of attention by all those interested in free will.
At the heart of Goetz’s view is that free “choices are, first and foremost, 
explained teleologically in terms of reasons, where reasons are purposes 
or goals” (p.  3). And it is this same consideration which leads him to 
reject both event-causal and agent-causal accounts of libertarian 
freedom. Why think that considerations of teleological explanation 
lead one to libertarianism in general, as opposed to compatibilism, 
and to a noncausal libertarian view in particular? The answers to these 
questions are at the heart of Goetz’s book. It is worth noting, however, 
that Goetz’s response to these questions does not exhaust the wealth of 
insights found in the book. Along the way he also addresses the nature 
of intentions, the continued debate about Frankfurt-cases and the 
principle of alternative possibilities, the problem of evil, primal sin, and 
more. many of these discussions are quite detailed, and there is no way 
to do justice to the depth and wealth of Goetz’s arguments in a review. 
but insofar as his treatment of these other issues depends upon what he 
sees as the relationship between teleology and libertarian freedom, that is 
where the review will focus.
We may begin by asking why someone might believe that we 
have libertarian freedom? unlike Carl Ginet, whose book On Action 
(Cambridge university Press, 1990) was, prior to Goetz’s book, the most 
developed noncausal libertarian account, Goetz does not base his belief in 
free will on the phenomenology of choice. Instead, for Goetz such a belief 
is basic in ‘the Plantingian sense’: “I am convinced that experiences of 
choosing, and not other beliefs, ground the belief that I have noncausal 
libertarian freedom” (p. 4). While Goetz never argues for the existence 
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of free will, he does however argue both for incompatibilism and 
noncausalism. before turning toward those arguments, it is worth 
noting that Goetz repeatedly utilizes two main strategies for responding 
to objections to his central argument. The first is a  tu quoque strategy, 
arguing that if a  particular objection against his noncausal libertarian 
view holds, it also holds against the view held by whomever raises the 
objection. (He uses this strategy against objections based on timothy 
o’Connor’s and randolph Clarke’s agent-causal views, as well as against 
various formulations of the luck objection.) The second strategy is to 
argue that the objection begs the question against Goetz’s own view. (He 
uses this against Davidson’s causalist challenge and, as we shall see below, 
proponents of Frankfurt-style examples.)
Goetz lays out his own view in chapters one and two. He is primarily 
concerned with choices, rather than actions, as he takes the former to be 
the ultimate locus of freedom. (In fact, he later denies that bodily acts can 
be free, insisting that choices are the only locus of freedom; see pages 80f.) 
At the heart of his view about free choice is the claim that “a choice is an 
event that is essentially uncaused and explained teleologically by a reason 
or purpose” (p. 36). We see here the two central features of Goetz’s view: 
(i) noncausalism and (ii) the centrality of teleology.
regarding (i), Goetz thinks that choices are simply not the kind of 
things that can be causally produced. on this issue, the heart of the book 
is section 2.1 where Goetz outlines the “mental ontological framework” 
that undergirds the rest of the volume. Here, Goetz differentiates between 
mental activity and mental passivity, a  distinction which is “grounded 
in the existence of two types of mental properties, namely powers and 
capacities. These two kinds of properties are inherently different from 
each other, and each is an ultimate ontological category” (p. 8). Since the 
nature of exercising a mental power is intrinsically active, such mental 
actions can have no causes: “any instance or token of mental action by 
nature lacks an efficient cause” (p. 8). Such exercisings of powers are not 
only essentially uncaused, but are also ontologically simple and primitive. 
It would be hard to overestimate the importance of these claims for 
Goetz’s book as a whole. For one, the incompatibility of free will and the 
truth of causal determinism follows pretty quickly from this ontology: 
“no exercising of a mental power can be causally determined because no 
exercise of a mental power can be causally produced” (p. 9). If a choice 
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cannot be causally produced, then it cannot be causally determined. 
This, coupled with the basic belief in free will, generates libertarianism. 
Furthermore, the same considerations also generate Goetz’s commitment 
to a version of PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities):
An agent has a power to chose, and, whenever he exercises it at a time 
t, he is free at that time to exercise it in a different way. In other words, 
when an agent is free to make either choice C1 or C2, it is not the case 
that he has one power to choose whose exercising is C1 and a  second 
power to chose whose exercising is C2. There is one, and only one, power 
to choose that can be exercised in only one of two or more incompatible 
ways. (p. 9)
And many of Goetz’s responses to other issues in the contemporary free 
will debates depend on his non-causal approach.
but is it really this easy to show that exercises of the will (i.e., volitions) 
are uncaused? Goetz thinks that one “only needs to be aware of his mental 
act of choosing to know that it is uncaused” (p. 16). He grants in a footnote 
that “introspection is not the final word” but that it “certainly is, however, 
the first word” (p. 159, note 24). but why think that this introspection 
is veridical? How might one attempt to persuade another who didn’t 
have the same introspective experience? There is, unfortunately, little 
argumentation here other than the ontological distinction mentioned 
above:
These two kinds of properties [i.e., mental powers and mental capacities] 
are inherently different from each other and each is an ultimate ontological 
category. Corresponding to these two kinds of mental properties are two 
kinds of event, namely an agent’s exercising of a mental power and the 
actualization of a mental capacity in him. (p. 50)
but why not instead think that the actualization of mental capacities 
can cause the exercising of a mental power? In non-agential examples, it 
deems that the actualization of capacities causally produces the exercise 
of powers. Consider, to use a non-agential example, the cell phone sitting 
here on my desk next to me, which has (among its numerous features) 
the power to produce a specific ringtone. It currently isn’t exercising this 
power. but if a certain one of its capacities (namely, the capacity to receive 
a  signal from the local cell-tower) is causally activated by an external 
source, then the phone will ring. So it looks like the exercise of a power 
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is not causally distinct from the actualization of a related capacity in all 
cases. And if this is true of non-agential capacities and powers, then it 
puts pressure on Goetz’s account of agential powers and capacities for 
whom the exercise of powers is causally independent of capacities. Goetz 
thinks that agential powers can be exercised without any causal input, 
including from previous acts of willing. It is for this reason that Goetz 
thinks there is no reason to adopt an agent-causal approach according 
to which one has the primitive agent-causal powers to cause acts of will:
What is gained for a libertarian account by postulating a power to cause 
acts of will (volitions or choices)? Why not just maintain that acts of 
will are exercising of the power to choose and because they are, they are 
essentially uncaused? This view is simpler and exemplifies all the virtues 
of the competing account. (p. 14)
like van Inwagen and others, Goetz thinks that the addition of agent-
causation is “explanatorily superfluous” (p.  4) insofar as it does not 
secure any further agential control than does the realization that actions 
are inherently teleological. 
This leads us to (ii), the second central element of Goetz’s positive 
view of free will, which is the centrality of teleology. While it is crucial 
for Goetz that choices are not caused, it is equally crucial that they 
have teleological explanations. Drawing on work by Donald Davidson, 
he argues that causal and teleological explanations are fundamentally 
different and irreducible kinds of explanation. An agent choosing between 
two actions may have competing reasons for choosing each of these 
behaviors, but such that “neither reason is sufficient for the occurrence 
of the relevant choice to act” (p. 19). Goetz grants that the reasons that an 
agent has may themselves be determined, but denies that that reasons act 
causally upon the agent. The reasons do not cause the action, but present 
the agent with a perceived future good to be brought about. So in cases 
where an agent is torn between two incompatible actions, she is torn 
between which future good to work towards – that is, she is torn between 
which reason to respond to. but whichever reason the agent chooses to 
act on explains the action and prevents it from being random. Goetz 
argues that sometimes free choices can be given contrastive explanations 
on his account, though presumably such explanations cannot always be 
given (as in the case of consciously chosen and reflective akratic actions). 
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Goetz’s forward-directing account of agential reasons is quite attractive, 
and relates to –  in chapter six –  robert Kane’s work on self-forming 
actions and michael bratman’s and robert Nozick’s work on life plans.
Chapters three and four aim at defending his account from a number 
of criticisms, mostly various versions of the luck objection against 
libertarians, and they deserve a  careful look for those interested in 
this debate. As mentioned earlier, Goetz’s account of the power to 
choose freely entails a  version of PAP, and in chapter five he attempts 
to defend that entailment from the challenge posed by Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples. This chapter stands at nearly fifty pages and is the 
longest in the volume by a  substantial margin; Goetz claims that this 
length is deserved since “no issue has influenced the discussion about free 
will more in the past thirty-five years than PAP” (p. 75). In this chapter, 
Goetz endorses and defends what is known as the Dilemma Defense 
– FSCs, once all the relevant factors are spelled out, are either such that 
the agent is morally responsible but still has alternative possibilities, or 
beg the question against the incompatibilist by presupposing the truth 
of determinism. Goetz’s treatment of this issue is as thorough as one 
will find in the current literature, engaging FSCs presented not only by 
Frankfurt, but also by Stump, mele and robb, Fischer, mcKenna, Haji 
and mcKenna, Pereboom, and Hunt. Goetz builds on earlier versions of 
the Dilemma Defense proposed by robert Kane and David Widerker. but 
then Goetz finds himself in “awkward position of defending PAP against 
[David] Widerker himself ” given that Widerker “has had a  change of 
mind and believes it is possible to construct two successful FSCs against 
PAP” (p. 113).
In the final chapter of the book, Goetz weaves together a number of 
issues: the relationship between free will and happiness, restrictivism, 
life plans, and the problem of evil. As with the middle chapters, there 
is substantially more content than I  can address in this review. For 
example, he argues at length that the theistic philosopher ought not be 
content with a mere defense, but rather needs to engage in theodicy in 
responding to the problem of moral evil. (With respect to the problem of 
animal suffering, Goetz thinks that a defense is sufficient. For the reasons 
behind this asymmetry, see pp. 152ff.) Goetz works to provide just such 
a theodicy based on the experience of complete happiness and the defeat 
of evil. rather than exploring this line of argumentation in greater 
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detail, however, I want to end by focusing on the connection between 
the account of free will that Goetz develops earlier and his treatment 
of theism and the problem of evil in this chapter. In the introduction, 
Goetz considers some comments by manuel Vargas about the correlation 
between libertarianism and theism (a  correlation which has been 
confirmed by the recent PhilPapers study conducted by David bourget 
and David Chalmers). In response to Vargas, Goetz claims that “I  do 
not espouse libertarianism because of my religion. rather, I espouse my 
religion because I am a libertarian. I am inclined to think that there is 
a supreme agent who acts for purposes because I am aware that I am an 
irreducible, substantive agent who acts for purposes” (p. 7). And while 
Goetz goes a considerable distance, via his proposed theodicy, in showing 
that God has a  morally justifying reason for allowing the existence of 
moral evil, he does not show how his account of free will gives reason to 
believe in God, as these comments from the introduction would suggest. 
What he instead gives is a defensive move in that it defeats a reason for 
not believing in such a being, rather than giving reason to believe that 
there is such a being. If Goetz does believe that the existence of noncausal 
teleological freedom gives positive reason for belief in the existence of 
God, this would be a very interesting argument.
Though I’ve indicated a  few places where I wish Goetz would have 
provided some supplemental argumentation, the book as a whole is rich in 
careful analysis and argument, particularly as it relates to the problem(s) 
of luck, the Dilemma Defense, FSCs, and the need for theodicy rather 
than mere defense. Those interested in these issues would be very well 
served by a careful reading of Goetz’s text.
